Trench Warfare

Tactics

In wars before 1914, the British Army had a general tried-and-tested plan for winning battles. After battering the enemy front with field guns, a charge by the cavalry would take place and the infantry would move in. It was thought that in this war the same idea could be used to bring about a war of movement. But this was not so: this time the British were not fighting an uncivilised community of Africans or a bunch of disorganised civilians calling themselves soldiers. Their enemy was an equally industrious country capable of meeting the technological advances of the other. The basics of attacking the enemy had changed: machine guns, artillery and other new weapons meant that great charges forward to the enemy trench would be futile. Warfare now favoured defence rather than offence. It was through hard lessons that the British – and other forces – realised this. Tactics had to change before a war of movement could return.

It was through this idea that the War of Attrition emerged: this redefined the word “sacrifice”. Men were no longer regarded as human beings; they were numbers and expendable resources that could be “used” to achieve objectives set out by the generals. This is where the morality of such a tactic can be called into question: military planners were willing to undertake serious numbers of casualties in order to achieve what might be a small goal. They understood that sending out an entire regiment would indeed result in a stack of dead bodies (and a great deal of work for the secretarial and nursing staff). Furthermore, if the attack did not bring to the generals the desired result, the logical conclusion was that the enemy force was greater, and so in the next attack a greater number of men would be used. This continued in ever-increasing numbers – and also increasing numbers of casualties – until the troops achieved a success. Although the war of attrition was a singularly slaughtering technique of obtaining a breakthrough, the generals felt that the war of movement must be brought back in order to win outright victory. So the Attrition tactics continued and the death toll continued to rise.

In trench warfare, attacks would usually follow this format:

Careful planning and research. For some time before the battle, generals would try to make a detailed plan of what was to happen, hopefully taking into consideration the numbers on each side, the positioning of the troops and perhaps even the weather. However, few battles went according to plan and it is surprising that there was a plan at the killing field of the Somme, where the British endured 56,000 casualties in the first day alone. Perhaps one of the most major failings of generals was to underestimate the enemy and exaggerate the supplies or superiority of British troops. Since the generals did not have to take a rifle in their hand or pierce someone with a bayonet, this can be understood but, certainly, not understanding the practicalities of the battlefield was a critical failing of the planners: they did not always appreciate the problem of mud or barbed wire and thousands of men could die at the stroke of a pen on a piece of paper.

Also, part of the information gathering stage was to find out weak spots in the enemy and send scouting parties at night to find out information about the whereabouts of the enemy. Sometimes prisoners were taken to have details extorted from them, probably on pain of death. Letters were censored and diaries forbidden: such was the security regarding an impending attack.

Softening up with Artillery. This would be the first stage of an attack. A ferocious flurry of shells and bullets would land on the enemy’s side of no-man’s land in an attempt to destroy dugouts, defences, disrupt barbed wire and either kill, maim or demoralise men (it would inevitably do one of those things). However, this did not always work to the advantage of the attacking side. It could create an ideal ground for snipers to operate from or make the trenches of the opposing side even more difficult to capture. Also, it gave the enemy the obvious signal that something important was going to happen – like an upcoming offensive – which gave the enemy time to prepare extra troops and supplies. Thus, the artillery fire, although intended to make light work for the infantry, could in fact ruin months of planning. One soldier said,

”British and French guns pounded the German trenches night and day for three weeks. It was a great pounding, but it cannot be said that the subsequent attack came as a surprise to the enemy.”

He continues by pointing out the post-Somme tactics

"You can no longer surround yourself with barbed wire and go comfortably to bed, secure in the knowledge that your opponent cannot possibly get at you without a long and laborious artillery preparation ...Today we have other methods. Three minutes of pandemonium from masses trench mortars ... a rush of tanks - and your defences are gone."

Clearly, artillery fire inflicted extreme destruction in any case.

Over the top was the next step. After the artillery bombardment had been finished, the troops moved to the front line where they made their final preparations for going “over the top”. That is, they were to leave the trench and advance towards the enemy’s front line. It was assumed that the preceding blitz by the big guns would have knocked out even the biggest of defences on the enemy side; this was not always the case. An officer gave the order and the soldiers clambered out, and began the terrifying advance from which 90% of those going would not return.

Soldiers preparing to leave the trench. Note the affixing of long, sharp bayonets

Nothing was supposed to have survived the supposedly paralysing bombardment, it was thought only a few men would be killed by pockets of resistance here and there, and it would therefore be acceptable to allow men to walk normally to the trenches ahead of them. After all, many of these men had been civilians a few months before and to them this was the most natural way, instead of complicated manoeuvres.

Men leaving a trench. Note the orderly, rank-and-file walking approach.