The Somme plan was conceived when the Germans began their Verdun offensive. Although by June the Germans had given up their offensive, the British decided to press on with their plans.

At first glance the Somme seems a strange place to launch an attack. The German front line snaked along the ridges of the high ground. This not only meant that the Germans could look down on their attackers, but also that the British would literally be facing an uphill battle.

The attacker’s major advantage was surprise. Although the British generals liked to keep their attack preparations secret, this did not happen on the Somme. German aircraft witnessed the massing of troops and artillery, and soldiers eavesdropped on British signallers shouting into their field telephones. The Germans knew where the attack would take place; they just had to find out when.

As so often happened, the bombardment identified this final crucial piece of the puzzle. Every German defender knew that once the shelling stopped, they would have only minutes to organise the defence of their line. The German commanders decided to strengthen their trenches (Fig.3). Barbed wire had already been reinforced in response to night raids. Now the shelters or dugouts were addressed. They would not stand up to prolonged bombardment and were therefore made deeper and given heavy concrete-lining to provide extra protection. With these passive defences sound, the deployment of the machine-guns was considered. These heavy monsters could not be set up and begin firing immediately. However, after much practice the German troops cut down the time needed to three minutes.

Like the Germans at Verdun, the British relied absolutely on their artillery. What they required was a barrage which was sustained and accurate. The artillery was lined up wheel to wheel for eighteen miles giving one artillery piece for every sixteen metres of enemy trench. For seven days and nights, one and a half million shells rained down on the Germans. The bombardment could be heard across the Channel in London.

In addition, engineers had been busy underneath the battlefield filling tunnels with high explosive. When detonated they would kill or bury thousands of enemy soldiers, and leave a toxic gas. Used jointly, the artillery and mines should have been decisive. However, it was only when the soldiers left their trenches and advanced that it was realised that this preparation had been cruelly inadequate.

The British attackers were by no means professional soldiers. They were mainly "Pals" regiments from London, Ulster and the Industrial North. Their commanders felt allowing them to run at the enemy would lead to a breakdown in discipline. Instead, soldiers were instructed to move at arms-distance apart at a steady walking pace (Fig.5). Casualties would be negligible as nothing would have survived the bombardment.