Unfortunately, the reality was often rather different from the theory. In order to look closer at how this plan worked in practice – or, as was more often the case, did not – this study will concentrate on two battles: Neuve Chapelle (March 1915) and the Somme (July-November 1916).

Neuve Chappelle

Named after the village, this battle was Britain’s first major trench assault. Britain attacked mainly to show the French they were serious about the war, and the commanders were anxious to do well. In order to win, a great problem had to be solved : How would large numbers of men run the gauntlet from their trenches to the enemy’s, without sustaining losses large enough to make the attack futile? After much discussion, a plan emerged which was felt would work. Large batteries of artillery would fire on a length of front appropriate to that amount of shelling. The shells would not only be aimed to kill but also to rip the barbed wire to shreds, ruin the trenches and destroy the machine guns and enemy artillery. After the infantry had captured the enemy’s line, that commander’s perennial favourite, the cavalry would roll in.

There were problems, however, right from stage one. Firstly, the British artillery was still relatively inexperienced. Secondly, they were several miles from the front and had to rely on second-hand information about where their shells landed. Thirdly, the artillery was inaccurate and not as devastating as it might have been.

However, by the time the British soldiers emerged from their dugouts the guns had done enough. Although Germans did survive to man the defences, they were overwhelmed. Just as the attackers entered their enemy’s trenches, and a breakthrough seemed assured, the attack faltered. Officers did not press home the attack and orders to do so did not get through. As a result the British Army was not forced to halt, it merely stopped walking. This hesitation was fatal. Under cover of darkness the Germans brought in reinforcements and twelve machine guns. By morning, orders had reached the right places, and the British generals had realised this was their chance to show cavalry still had a place in modern warfare. Once again, the British infantry advanced, but by now it was too late. Those twelve machine-guns stopped the entire British Expeditionary Force. The cavalry didn’t even show their faces. Thirteen thousand British dead and wounded was a high price to pay for one ruined village. The numbers shocked the British public. But even worse, now the Germans knew the British were serious about the war, every future British assault would be much, much harder…. and so too casualties much, much higher.

In the aftermath of Neuve Chapelle, both sides paused to reconsider. Many lessons had been learned on defence and offence. The Germans did not feel their trenches had been adequate and decided they needed more of them with deeper defences to stop a minor infiltration from becoming a breakthrough. On the other hand, the British felt that their basic notion had been right. Next time though they must redouble their efforts (ie. more guns, shells, men and a wider front should be used). Now this study will examine whether these were indeed the right lessons, and whether they had been learned.